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Saudi Arabia Exporting Salafi 
Education and Radicalizing 
Indonesia’s Muslims
Amanda Kovacs
Salafis, who defend a very conservative, literal interpretation of Islam and treat 
Shia Muslims with hostility, are not just a phenomenon in the Middle East. They 
are increasingly pressuring Shias and other religious minorities in Indonesia, 
too.
Analysis
Saudi Arabia is the world’s main provider of Islamic education. In addition 
to promoting Salafism and maligning other religious communities, Saudi 
educational materials present the kingdom in a favorable light and can also 
exacerbate religious strife, as they are doing in Indonesia. The Saudi educational 
program aims to create global alliances and legitimize the Saudi claim to be the 
leader of Islam – at home and abroad.
  Since switching to democracy in 1998, Indonesia has been shaken time and 
again by Salafi religious discrimination and violence, often on the part of 
graduates of LIPIA College in Jakarta, which was founded by Saudi Arabia 
in 1980.
  Domestically, Saudi Arabia uses educational institutions to stabilize the 
system; since the 1960s, it has become the largest exporter of Islamic education. 
After Saudi Arabia began to fight with Iran for religious hegemony in 1979, 
it founded schools and universities worldwide to propagate its educational 
traditions.
  In Jakarta, LIPIA represents a Saudi microcosm where Salafi norms and 
traditions prevail. LIPIA not only helps Saudi Arabia to influence Indonesian 
society, it also provides a gateway to all of Southeast Asia.
  As long as Muslim societies fail to create attractive government-run 
educational institutions for their citizens, there will be ample room for Saudi 
influence.
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Salafism Is Polarizing Indonesia’s 
Muslims
Although Indonesia was a popular example 
for the peaceful coexistence of the most var-
ied religions under Suharto’s military dicta-
torship (1967–1998), since democracy was in-
troduced in 1998, numerous religious con-
flicts have come to the fore (Human Rights 
Watch 2013). While these conflicts were re-
pressed by Suharto, the new room to maneu-
ver means that in predominantly Sunni Indo-
nesia conflicts are now erupting with great-
er intensity.1 Since 2011, there has been a dra-
matic increase in violence against and dis-
crimination of Shia Muslims:2 In February 
2011, a group of 200 Sunnis devastated a Shi-
ite boarding school in Bangil and injured nine 
pupils. That December, another boarding 
school in Sampang was violently attacked. Its 
300 residents were driven out and are still liv-
ing in emergency shelters. Tajul Muluk, the 
director of the destroyed Shia establishment, 
was sentenced to two years in prison for blas-
phemy. When he appealed, his sentence was 
increased to four years. In 2012, the minister 
for religious affairs, Suryadharma Ali, stated 
that Shia Islam is a false interpretation of Is-
lam. In this year’s presidential election cam-
paign, conservative Sunni leaders like Cholil 
Ridwan, who was trained at the Islamic Uni-
versity in Medina, called for crusades against 
the candidate Joko Widodo (Indonesian Dem-
ocratic Party of Struggle, Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P), because it was 
rumored that if victorious, he might name 
the Shiite intellectual Jalaluddin Rakhmat as 
minister for religious affairs (Vice News 2014).
These antagonistic attitudes among parts 
of the Indonesian population towards the 
Shia minority, estimated at approximately 2.5 
million, are also transferred to other non-Sun-
ni groups. Ahmadis also suffer violent perse-
cution and deadly attacks, which Indonesian 
law either does not punish at all or only very 
1 The following information is the result of the author’s 
fieldwork in Indonesia and her source evaluations.
2 With more than 191 million Muslims, Indonesia has the 
world’s largest Muslim population; its 240 million inhabitants 
make it the world’s fourth-largest nation by population. Six 
religions are officially recognized: Islam (approx. 87 percent 
of the population), Protestantism (7 percent), Catholicism (3 
percent), Hinduism (1.9 percent), Buddhism (1 percent), and 
Confucianism (0.13 percent).
mildly penalizes, with just a few months in 
prison. On the other hand, Ahmadis in Indo-
nesia have been forbidden to proselytize since 
2008. Violators risk five years’ imprisonment.
Most of the violent acts against Muslim 
minorities are carried out by members of the 
Salafi3 Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pem-
bela Islam, FPI), founded in 1999. Wrapped 
in white robes and turbans, FPI members set 
out with wooden clubs to attack what in their 
view are dissidents and un-Islamic establish-
ments – people who belong to the Liberal Is-
lam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal, JIL), 
and discotheques, nightclubs, and restau-
rants that serve alcohol. The FPI is modeled 
on the Saudi religious police, who act as mor-
al guardians. FPI founder Habib Rizieq at-
tended the Saudi Islamic and Arabic College 
of Indonesia (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Is-
lam dan Arab, LIPIA)4 in Jakarta, then contin-
ued his studies in Riyadh with a Saudi gov-
ernment scholarship.
The Indonesian Salafi Warriors of Jihad 
(Laskar Jihad, LJ) was founded in the year 
2000, when Muslims and Christians were vi-
olently clashing on the eastern Moluccan is-
lands. Before it was disbanded in 2002, the 
LJ mobilized thousands of Indonesian Mus-
lims, trained them militarily, and led them to 
fight Christians. The group was identifiable 
by their broad white pants and shirts reminis-
cent of traditional Saudi clothing, and their 
machetes. The founding of the LJ, its violence, 
and its subsequent dissolution were justified 
by legal opinions of Saudi and Yemeni schol-
ars whom the LJ founder Jafar Umar Thalib 
consulted in consideration of the situation in 
the Moluccas.
Like the FPI founder, Jafar Umar Thalib 
graduated from LIPIA, the Saudi college in 
Jakarta. It is striking that many prominent In-
donesian Salafis attended LIPIA. LIPIA alum-
ni Abu Nida, Ahmad Faiz Asifuddin, and 
Aunur Rafiq Ghufron are key actors in the 
spread of Salafism through pesantren (Islamic 
boarding schools); LIPIA graduates Zain al-
3 Salafism is understood as a literal reading of the Koran, 
which, with the Hadith, is supposed to inform all aspects of 
life. The academic literature distinguishes between political 
and jihadist Salafists, who are ready to use violence, and the 
quietistic, who are not interested in any political activities. 
For an introduction see: Said and Fouad 2014.
4 See: <www.lipia.org>.
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Muttaqin, Nurcholis Ridwan, and Hepi Andi 
founded the anti-West, anti-Semitic, Salafist 
magazine Sabili.
Guided by the values and traditions of 
the “Wahhabi” Salafism of Saudi Arabia, 
these Islamist actors foment inter- and intra-
religious tension in Indonesian society. Not 
only is their religious engagement Islamiz-
ing Indonesia with shades of Salafism, it is 
also Arabizing the country.
In the Saudi government’s effort to spread 
Salafism, and especially its anti-Shia ideolo-
gy, transnational educational institutions like 
LIPIA in Indonesia play an important role in 
building alliances. Following the 1979 Shia 
revolution in Iran and the Iranian/Saudi he-
gemonic conflict that ensued, Indonesia took 
on major strategic importance for Saudi reli-
gious politics. With the world’s largest Mus-
lim population, Indonesia is of particular in-
terest to Saudi Arabia, which views it as the 
base and gateway for relations with the Mus-
lims of Southeast Asia. Each year Indonesia 
sends the largest share of Muslim pilgrims to 
the holy places in Mecca and Medina (hajj). 
This religious tourism brings money into the 
country, so Saudi Arabia also has a financial 
interest in maintaining good relations with 
Indonesia.
Islamic Education Helps Legitimize 
Saudi Arabia Domestically
Saudi transnational educational institutions 
reflect the country’s self-image and export its 
educational content. Educational establish-
ments also serve an important domestic func-
tion for Saudi Arabia: spreading its own inter-
pretation of Islam, and legitimizing and stabi-
lizing the regime. Since it was established in 
1932, the Saudi kingdom has had credibility 
problems: on the one hand, its rulers preach 
the very strict Wahhabism that rejects moder-
nity and a Western lifestyle, while on the oth-
er, the country maintains close political and 
economic relations with the West, especial-
ly the USA. While modern technology and 
twenty-first-century Western consumer be-
havior have long since become commonplace 
in Saudi Arabia, civil rights, women’s rights 
and the rights of religious minorities reflect 
its conservative tribal culture. These polit-
ical and social contradictions are fodder for 
the opposition, and especially for the Salafis, 
who understand an Islamic state as one that 
renounces everything Western and consider 
the House of Saud to be illegitimate. With this 
view, in 1979 heavily armed Islamist radicals 
seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca, denounc-
ing the royal dynasty and criticizing Wahha-
bi scholars for supporting it. In an attempt to 
prevent similar uprisings, Saudi Arabia has 
since sought to socialize its citizens in confor-
mity with the state. Saudi educational insti-
tutions teach Wahhabism and peddle a posi-
tive image of the royal family, describing the 
country as chosen by God to be Islam’s glob-
al center and the leader of the Muslim world. 
Saudi pedagogy generally opposes free and 
critical thinking and teaches blind obedience 
and submission to the existing religious-po-
litical order.
Scholarly analyses (Center for Religious 
Freedom of Freedom House 2006; Groiss 
2003) of the ideology taught in Saudi school-
books find that it promotes an antipluralis-
tic worldview with stereotypes of the enemy. 
The teaching material is intended to cement 
loyalty to the supposedly single, true, and 
immutable Islam – an interpretation that sets 
apart the Saudi form of Islam, and preach-
es hatred of atheists, Jews, Christians, Hin-
dus, and all Muslim groups that do not fol-
low the Saudi interpretation, especially Sufis 
and Shias. Textbooks also teach that the West 
is a permanent threat to Muslims – from the 
time of the Crusades and continuing with in-
ternational Zionism, which strives for world 
domination and is pushing Muslims into the 
defensive. Other threats come from Western 
ideologies such as nationalism, communism, 
socialism, secularism, humanism, and exis-
tentialism.
Saudi schoolbooks place significant value 
on proper Muslim behavior and strict tradi-
tional Wahhabi bans regarding everyday life 
– on music, singing, wearing silk, and using 
gold and silver. Shia and mystical religious 
practices are considered to be idolatrous. 
Strict adherence to gender segregation and 
proper clothing for women, which includes 
total veiling, except for a slit for the eyes and 
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the hands, is pushed. In addition to Wahhabi 
doctrine, Saudi textbooks also spread politi-
cal propaganda aimed at concealing the con-
tradictions between Wahhabi belief and West-
ern modernity within the Saudi state.
History texts in particular glorify the role 
of the Saudi founding father, King Abd al-
Aziz, who reigned from 1932 to 1953. The 
Saud family rule is portrayed as legitimate 
because the king unified the warring Arab 
tribes on the Arabian peninsula, led them to 
the “true Islam,” and ensured law and order. 
Saudi Arabian history is presented as a pro-
cess of modernization: the King introduced 
great advances in education, health servic-
es, technology, communication, and social af-
fairs. The country’s role in the Muslim world 
is presented as outstanding, as indicated by 
the numerous international Islamic organi-
zations, such as the Muslim World League 
(1962)5 and the Organization of Islamic Co-
operation (OIC, 1969),6 that it has founded. 
After the 11 September 2001 attacks, which 
involved 15 Saudi nationals, pressure from 
the USA led Saudi Arabia to announce that 
it was going to revise its national curriculum 
and remove discriminatory, antipluralistic 
passages. In the end, however, the reform 
was superficial: Saudi teaching materials re-
main very intolerant (Steinberg 2007).
Saudi Arabia Becomes the Main 
Exporter of Islamic Education
Since the 1960s Saudi Arabia has become the 
biggest exporter of Islamic education. This 
development has been driven by certain do-
mestic and global political turning points, be-
ginning with the so-called Arab Cold War, in 
which socialist Egypt, under President Gamal 
Abd al-Nasser, and Saudi Arabia used edu-
cational institutions to battle for ideological 
hegemony. In 1961, Egypt’s Law No. 103 was 
enacted to nationalize and centralize Cairo’s 
tradition-steeped Islamic al-Azhar Universi-
ty. The reform granted al-Azhar scholars con-
trol of the Islamic heritage and encouraged 
5 See: <www.themwl.org>.
6 See: <www.oic-oic.org>.
them to proselytize abroad. Al-Azhar was de-
clared the center for propagating Islam and 
Nasser’s Arab-Socialist vision of pan-Ara-
bism. This was a frontal attack on Saudi Ara-
bia’s religious and political status within the 
Muslim world; in reaction and as a countering 
institution to al-Azhar, the Islamic University 
of Medina was founded that same year. Wah-
habi scholars run the university; from the be-
ginning, the stated goal was the international 
mission, which today occurs mostly through 
generous scholarships for foreign students.
The Muslim World League, officially a 
nongovernmental organization, was found-
ed in 1962. With Saudis in all major positions 
and the Saudi state by far the League’s largest 
funder, it is effectively an institution of Sau-
di foreign policy. The Muslim World League 
maintains a global network of educational es-
tablishments, cultural centers, mosques, pub-
lishing companies, and aid organizations that 
promote Wahhabi/Salafi Islam and legitimize 
Saudi rule. The League’s ability to foment or 
stoke religious conflicts is viewed critical-
ly (Steinberg 2004). A few years after Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia began to compete for glob-
al leadership of the Muslim community, King 
Faisal (reign: 1964–1975) ascended the Saudi 
throne. He combined his pan-Islamic world-
view with his plan to modernize the country 
and developed the Wahhabi line in the Sau-
di curriculum to distance himself from Nass-
er and socialism.
When, in 1973, oil brought wealth to Saudi 
Arabia, Faisal invested in the Muslim World 
League. Saudi Arabia’s new prosperity al-
lowed the kingdom to demonstrate its lead-
ership of the Muslim world by becoming the 
largest funder of transnational education-
al institutions for propagating the Wahhabi 
worldview and Saudi political propaganda – 
and thus to secure alliances. Saudi Arabia be-
came the world’s premier exporter of Islamic 
education. In Riyadh in 1974, the Imam Mu-
hammad bin Saud University was founded; 
with the Islamic Universities in Mecca and 
Medina, it formed the core of the Saudi re-
ligious university system, and it developed 
into the largest Wahhabi educational institu-
tion in the country. To this day it trains most 
of the country’s scholars: judges, imams, re-
ligious teachers, missionaries, and function-
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aries of the religious police. It has five inter-
national branches – in the Emirate Ras al-
Khaimah, Djibouti, Tokyo, Fairfax (USA), 
and Jakarta – and grants a large number of 
scholarships to foreigners to study Islam in 
Riyadh. Since 1979 and Iran’s Islamic revo-
lution, transnational educational institutions 
have become much more significant for Sau-
di foreign policy. The Iranian revolution end-
ed Saudi Arabia’s supremacy in the Islam-
ic world: The Shiite theocracy strives to de-
prive the Saudi regime of its legitimacy and 
its role as protector of the holy sites in Mecca 
and Medina. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia must 
always reckon with uprisings of its own re-
pressed Shia population. In the Saudi/Iranian 
struggle for hegemony, Saudi educational in-
stitutions play a major role in repressing Shia 
Islam in other countries and establishing in-
ternational ideological alliances.7
LIPIA: A Saudi Microcosm in Jakarta
In 1980, in reaction to Iran’s Islamic revo-
lution, the Saudi government founded LI-
PIA, a branch of the Imam Muhammad bin 
Saud University in Riyadh, to be an ideolog-
ical bulwark in Jakarta. LIPIA offers a bach-
elor’s degree in Islamic Law, a diploma pro-
gram for Arabic-language teachers, and pre-
paratory courses for both programs. LIPIA 
comes under the Saudi Ministry of Higher 
Education and is entirely financed by Saudi 
Arabia. The curricula and teaching materials 
reflect the Saudi worldview. Although LIPIA 
does not subscribe to Indonesia’s concept of a 
religiously pluralistic democratic society, the 
Indonesian government allows it to operate 
freely. LIPIA is seen as helping Indonesia to 
7 The conflict is based on the contrasting worldviews of Sunni 
and Shia Islam and the different political systems. Since 1744 
Saudi Arabia has been based on an alliance between the Islam 
reformer Abd al-Wahhab and the ruler Ibn Saud – a symbiosis 
of worldly and religious power. Saudi Wahhabi scholars, who 
take as their model the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed 
and his followers as well as the literalist Hanbali School of 
Islamic Law, run religious life in Saudi Arabia, while the 
descendants of Ibn Saud rule politically. Wahhabi scholars 
and the Saudi people are depoliticized; there are no elections. 
In contrast, Iranian Shia legal scholars have leading positions 
in government, and elections allow Iranians some degree of 
political participation.
solidify its bilateral relations with Saudi Ara-
bia; its presence helps to upgrade Indonesia’s 
ailing educational infrastructure. Indonesian 
government educational institutions suffer 
from a lack of financing, poor facilities, and 
insufficiently trained lecturers.
The teaching of Arabic as the language of 
Islamic culture is quantitatively and qualita-
tively underdeveloped in Indonesia. LIPIA’s 
modern facilities and native-speaker Arabic 
instructors create an important role for LIPIA 
in Indonesia’s Islamic educational system. In 
terms of services for students, who are strict-
ly separated by gender on campus like in 
Saudi Arabia, LIPIA is unequaled in Indone-
sia. Students receive monthly allowances and 
free medical care; some even get free dormi-
tory accommodation.
LIPIA mostly seeks to attract Muslim stu-
dents from Indonesia’s eastern, mostly Chris-
tian regions, as well students from elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia – in order to strengthen Is-
lam wherever it is a minority religion or has 
mixed with other religions or cultures. Top 
male students, who are willing to learn the 
Koran by heart and can be expected to prop-
agate Saudi ideas in Southeast Asia, are giv-
en grants for the Imam Muhammad bin Saud 
University in Riyadh. Their stay in Riyadh 
is intended to make them more committed 
to Wahhabi values and more sympathetic to 
Saudi rule.
Lessons in Jakarta transfer deeply rooted 
discourses from Saudi Arabia to Indonesia, 
with teachers required to impart the superior-
ity of the Hanbali School of Law. Saudi Ara-
bia is presented as the only country where Is-
lamic law is properly implemented, while Ar-
abic texts and statements by lecturers glori-
fy Saudi Arabia’s origin, the House of Saud, 
and the country’s significance for the Mus-
lim world. Arabic classes serve as vehicles for 
both Islamic and political propaganda.
LIPIA has also set out to translate – from 
Arabic into Indonesian and other Southeast 
Asian languages – and disseminate writ-
ings on Saudi religious and political authori-
ties as well as essays on certain religious sub-
jects. The Indonesian-language publications, 
which circulate on the LIPIA campus, prop-
agate the Wahhabi worldview and antago-
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nisms such as hatred of Shia Muslims, and le-
gitimize Saudi domestic and foreign policy.
Everyday life on campus is permeated by 
commandments and prohibitions intended 
to shape the students according to the Sau-
di model: Wearing jeans, loud laughter, lis-
tening to music, and watching television 
are all prohibited. In contrast, the common 
dress style for Saudi men – ankle-length linen 
pants, sandals, goatees – and the use of neem 
sticks are all encouraged. These characteris-
tic Salafi signs are supposedly based on the 
Prophet’s practices. Women are expected to 
veil themselves completely.
LIPIA encourages Indonesian Islamists 
and permits the Indonesian Muslim Student 
Action Union (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa 
Muslim Indonesia, KAMMI), whose declared 
goal is to establish an Islamic state, to be ac-
tive on campus. KAMMI is considered to be 
the student wing of the Islamist Prosperous 
Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), 
which is modeled on the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, and LIPIA is generally held to 
be a collecting tank for future PKS support-
ers. After the Muslim Brotherhood was vio-
lently suppressed in Egypt in May 2014, Sau-
di Arabia declared it a “terrorist organiza-
tion.” The influence this will have on LIPIA’s 
relationship to KAMMI and the PKS remains 
to be seen.
LIPIA’s networking strategy is obvious: 
Over the years its collaboration with the In-
donesian state has grown noticeably closer. 
Today a B.A. degree in Islamic Law from LI-
PIA is considered equivalent to a B.A. from 
one of Indonesia’s national Islamic universi-
ties, which are viewed as liberal. This allows 
LIPIA graduates to continue their studies at 
Indonesian Islamic universities, which they 
can infiltrate with their Salafi thought. High-
ly qualified LIPIA lecturers are similarly al-
lowed to teach at Indonesian institutions of 
higher education.
Although LIPIA’s influence on the spread 
of Salafism in Indonesia should not be under-
estimated, it appears that lots of students deal 
pragmatically with its regulations. For exam-
ple, many students follow the LIPIA dress 
code on campus but not at home.
Saudi Educational Exports Are 
Challenging Societal Concepts  
Based on the Nation-State
For decades, Saudi Arabia has taken advan-
tage of the failure of most Muslim societies to 
offer their citizens good educational oppor-
tunities and Islamic education in an environ-
ment with modern facilities. The Saudi edu-
cational institutes’ support for Salafism and 
glorification of Saudi rule challenge the host 
countries’ educational traditions; Saudi trans-
national educational establishments become 
reservoirs for Islamist ideologies that ques-
tion the host society’s status quo and the right 
of other religious communities to exist. Col-
laboration between Saudi and local institu-
tions and organizations is particularly insidi-
ous for secular or religiously pluralist societ-
ies, and countries that do not invest in their 
educational systems remain open to Saudi in-
fluence. As the politically radical Salafi move-
ments show, the Saudi educational offerings 
could challenge the legitimacy of the Indo-
nesian state, and even lead to political upris-
ings. Western educational aid that encourag-
es democratic values and religious pluralism 
offers a broad range of possibilities for coun-
teracting this Saudi activity.
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